Ireland | Ombudsman reform paper

The Ombudsman, Emily O'Reilly, wrote on 2 February to the leaders and relevant spokespersons of the political parties represented in the outgoing Dáil with her proposals on how the Ombudsman's Office can best contribute to reform of government.

In a document entitled Developing and Optimising the Role of the Ombudsman, Ms. O'Reilly makes four specific proposals which, she believes, will allow her Office to maximise its contribution to governmental reform.

The proposals are for:

• Constitutional status for the Office of Ombudsman; This was recommended in 1996 by the Constitution Review Group in order that the Ombudsman would be seen to be independent and to be “able to operate without being influenced by Government action”. This would place the Ombudsman in the same position as, for example, the Comptroller and Auditor General thus ensuring that administrative accountability will be taken as seriously as financial accountability. The enhanced independence of the Ombudsman, derived from Constitutional recognition, will undoubtedly increase public confidence in the Office as well as requiring the public service to ensure its engagement with the Office is genuinely co-operative.

• Improvement in the reporting relationship with the Oireachtas; As in many other countries, the work of the Ombudsman will be enhanced where there is a direct reporting relationship with a specific Oireachtas Committee which both monitors and supports the work of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman envisages that such a Committee would have regular constructive and critical interaction with her. In the event of a recommendation being rejected, it is to this Committee that the Ombudsman would report. The Ombudsman would expect to have her investigations and recommendations reviewed critically by this Committee which would make its own assessment of her work. Provided the Committee acted independently, and not on a party whip basis, the Ombudsman could have no complaint should the Committee take the view that her recommendation should not be supported. There is also scope for considering whether the Oireachtas, through this Committee, might ask the Ombudsman to conduct specific enquiries on its behalf.

• Extension of the Ombudsman remit to include the prisons and all issues relating to immigration, refugees, asylum seekers and naturalisation; There has never been any good reason why these areas have remained outside the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction. For other national Ombudsman Offices these areas have always been a central element of the overall jurisdiction. In the absence of access to the Ombudsman, asylum seekers in particular are left with no alternative other than the High Court when they are unhappy with how they have been treated. More than half of all judicial review applications (749 applications in 2009) are asylum related. There is little evidence that the improvements in public administration generally, mentioned above, have been a feature of the administration of these areas which have remained outside the Ombudsman’s remit.

• More transparent procedures for the appointment of the Ombudsman. Under the Ombudsman Act 1980, the Ombudsman is appointed by the President following a resolution passed by the Dáil and Seanad. In effect, the appointment is in the gift of the Government of the day. In the interests of transparency, there is a strong case for having a prospective Ombudsman attend some kind of confirmation hearing before the Oireachtas Committee charged with monitoring and supporting the work of the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman has also sent her proposals to each of the outgoing independent Dáil deputies seeking re-election.

Source: Irish Ombudsman